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 Eugen Bleuler’s Concept of
Schizophrenia and Its Relevance to 
Present-Day Psychiatry 
 Paul Hoff  
 Psychiatric University Hospital,  Zurich , Switzerland
 
 This paper links the historical perspective with the ac-
tual debate on the concept of schizophrenia. By this, two 
aims shall be accomplished. First, to prove that the bleu-
lerian concept in its central parts was a clear step forward, 
as compared to previous approaches, especially the no-
tion of dementia praecox that had been proposed and fa-
vored by French authors like Bénédict Augustin Morel 
(1809–1873) and, in Germany, by Emil Kraepelin (1856–
1926). The second aim is to strengthen the position, that 
profound knowledge of and continuous reflection upon 
historical and epistemological issues in psychiatry are 
much more than ‘l’art pour l’art’ – they constitute an es-
sential part of psychiatry as a clinical and scientific field. 
 Psychiatry Is in Need of the Historical and 
Epistemological Perspectives 
 As a medical discipline, psychiatry, in some respects, 
finds itself in a special situation. It is much closer inter-
related with developments in society and politics than 
other medical fields. And psychiatry always dealt with, 
not to say consisted of controversial theories, regarding 
such central topics as models of illness, diagnosis and 
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therapy  [1] . For example, no other medical area experi-
enced such a profound criticism towards its basic as-
sumptions as did psychiatry when confronted with the 
positions of anti-psychiatry. In addition, psychiatry and 
psychotherapy are indispensably and strongly depending 
on theoretical presuppositions, which typically reach far 
beyond the medical field in a narrow sense, e.g. the issues 
of mind-body relationship, the dichotomy between sub-
jective and objective methods and intersubjectivity. Fi-
nally, ethical considerations are always of crucial impor-
tance for any clinical decision, especially given the ten-
sion between paternalistic approaches with their strong 
emphasis on the competence of the medical specialist on 
the one side and the notion of personal autonomy of any 
person, be he or she mentally healthy or not, on the other 
side. All these topics play a significant role for any pos-
sible model of mental illness. 
 These special features of psychiatry have always been 
present in our field. Even a brief look at its history since 
about 1800 reveals a highly heterogeneous and controver-
sial collection of models. They are, of course, closely cou-
pled with the historical conditions under which they were 
formulated. Therefore, the need for the historical per-
spective becomes obvious in order to profoundly compre-
hend these complex developments. Just some prominent 
examples of psychiatric models since the time of enlight-
enment shall be mentioned without going into any detail: 
Romantic psychiatry (Johann Christian August Hein-
roth 1 ), unitarian psychosis (Albert Zeller, Wilhelm 
Griesinger), natural disease entities (Emil Kraepelin), the 
group of schizophrenias (Eugen Bleuler), the etiological 
relevance of unconscious mental events (Sigmund Freud), 
anthropological psychiatry (Ludwig Binswanger), the 
‘somatosis postulate’ (Kurt Schneider), the approach of 
structural dynamics (Werner Janzarik), anti-psychiatry 
(Thomas Szasz), system theory (Paul Watzlawick), cogni-
tive behavioral approach (Aaron Beck), neurotransmis-
sion (Arvid Carlsson), the concept of denosologization 
(Herman van Praag) and, finally, the different facets of 
molecular psychiatry in recent years. 
 To cut that short, four approaches to understand or 
define mental disorders can be identified as underlying 
the, for some, embarrassing multitude of theories in psy-
chiatry:
 (1)  Mental disorder as neurobiological dysfunction. In 
this view, the cause and ‘real’ character, not to say the ‘es-
sence’ of mental illness is a biological dysfunction of the 
CNS, whereas psychopathological phenomena are seen as 
mere epiphenomena of the underlying somatic process. 
 (2)  Mental disorder as biographically understandable 
individual reaction or development. This approach fo-
cuses on understanding psychologically, by means of em-
pathy and interpretation, the process that, for example, 
leads from constraining life events to increased numbers 
of critical situations and, finally, to a severe depressive 
episode with somatic symptoms. This, however, does not 
imply that any case of mental disorder will be fully ex-
plainable. But the focus here is clearly on the understand-
ing of biographical developments and much less on the 
neurobiological level.
 (3)  Mental disorder as socially understandable indi-
vidual reaction or development. Psychopathological phe-
nomena in this view have to be seen in a much broader 
than the individual context. The relevant groups of peo-
ple the patient lives or works with, social and economic 
circumstances, even society in general have to be taken 
into account, e.g. when a given mental disorder is under-
stood as a consequence of long unemployment or, more 
generally, of bad living conditions. Of course, the indi-
vidual perspective is still important here. The emphasis, 
however, is on factors reaching far beyond the single per-
son.
 (4)  Mental disorder as descriptive abnormality. This is 
the way chosen by modern operationalized diagnostic 
manuals, ICD-10  [2] and DSM-IV  [3] . They represent a 
nominalistic and pragmatic diagnostic approach that 
does not claim to make statements about etiology 2 , patho-
genesis or therapy of any given mental disorder, but to 
provide the clinician with reliable diagnostic concepts. 
This idea had already been supported by Kurt Schneider 
(1887–1967), the Heidelberg psychopathologist who sug-
gested ‘first rank symptoms’ for the diagnosis of schizo-
phrenia. These ‘FRS’ were intended to be reliable diag-
nostic criteria with no direct link to etiological hypoth-
eses.
 In addition to these more general reasons why the his-
torical perspective is important for psychiatric theories, I 
want to emphasize  two remarkable parallels regarding the 
field of psychiatry in the decades around the years 1900 
and 2000:
 1   Names in brackets are examples of important contributors, not refer-
ences.  
 2   This principle, however, is not fully respected throughout the diagnos-
tic manuals. For example, the F0 and F1 groups in ICD-10 carry etiologi-
cal hypotheses even in their titles (F0: Organic, including symptomatic, 
mental disorders; F1: Mental and behavioral disorders due to psychoactive 
substance use) [2]. 
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 • Both periods witnessed a strong tendency to natural-
ize psychiatry in general and psychopathological phe-
nomena in particular. However, I cannot address the 
complex issue of degeneration theory here, although 
that is a highly relevant topic in the history of psychia-
try. A considerable number of thorough research ac-
tivities addressed this field in the last decades, espe-
cially regarding classical authors like Emil Kraepelin, 
Richard von Krafft-Ebing or Eugen Bleuler  [4–6] . 
Nevertheless, continuing interdisciplinary investiga-
tions are still needed. The crucial point in our present 
context is that at the end of the 19th and the end of the 
20th century psychiatry focused on (neuro-)biological 
approaches to or even explanations of pathological 
mental phenomena and, at least in relevant parts, un-
derstood itself as an empirical neuroscientific field.  
 • Both periods included engaged debates on the best way 
to define or clarify psychiatry’s identity as a clinical 
and research discipline. There is, however, a certain 
difference here. At the end of the 19th century, psy-
chiatry, first of all, had to establish itself as an academ-
ic field. With some self-confidence, it developed or ap-
plied new empirical approaches in close neighborhood 
to the natural sciences, especially to biology. As op-
posed to this, psychiatry today is in a much more de-
fensive position. Its future identity may seem question-
able if the huge overlapping with fields as biochemistry, 
neurophysiology, brain imaging, genetics and neuro-
psychology is taken into account. Some would prefer to 
replace the term psychiatry by, for example, clinical 
neuroscience or behavioral neurobiology. 
 To fully comprehend these parallels and discrepancies 
between Bleuler’s time and today and – even more impor-
tant – to make this knowledge useful for our ongoing de-
bate on the identity of psychiatry, the methods and results 
of research into the history of psychiatric ideas, ‘concep-
tual history’ in German Berrios’ phrase  [7] , are strongly 
needed. 
 Indeed, there is reason to be moderately optimistic in 
this respect. In the last decades, the interest in the history 
of psychiatry rose considerably, as did the number of sci-
entific publications related to that field. This is also the 
case for research on Eugen Bleuler  [8–13] . 
 Eugen Bleuler and the Group of Schizophrenias 
 Eugen Bleuler lived from 1857 to 1939. He received his 
residential training in psychiatry from 1881 to 1886. 
From 1886 to 1898, he was the medical director of the 
mental asylum in Rheinau in the most northern part of 
the canton of Zurich. From there, he returned to the Uni-
versity of Zurich and was appointed to the chair of psy-
chiatry at the psychiatric university hospital, the ‘Burg-
hölzli’. This position he occupied from 1898 to 1927, near-
ly 30 years. He was elected head of the medical faculty 
from 1902 to 1904 and rector of the University of Zurich 
from 1924 to 1926. 
 It was on April 24th, 1908, when Bleuler for the first 
time used the term schizophrenia or group of schizo-
phrenias in public. This happened on the occasion of a 
psychiatric meeting in Berlin at the Charité hospital 
where Bleuler gave a lecture titled ‘Prognosis of Dementia 
praecox (Group of Schizophrenias)’. To give an impres-
sion of the type of arguments he brought forward I quote 
the most important passage of his talk:
 ‘… I wish to emphasize again that the kraepelinian de-
mentia praecox neither necessarily is a dementia, nor 
does it necessarily require praecocitas. Therefore, and be-
cause it is not possible to create proper adjectives or nouns 
from the term dementia praecox, I allow myself here to 
suggest the word  schizophrenia to characterize the krae-
pelinian notion. I do believe that the interruption or dis-
sociation of mental functions is an outstanding symptom 
of the whole group, and I will give reasons for this else-
where.’ [ 14 , translated by P.H.].
 And indeed, 3 years later, in 1911, Eugen Bleuler pub-
lished his chapter on ‘Dementia praecox or the group of 
schizophrenias’ in Gustav Aschaffenburg’s widely recog-
nized handbook of psychiatry  [15] . It is a very long chap-
ter of 420 pages. Here, Bleuler gave a comprehensive and 
detailed overview of his new concept, its origins and clin-
ical consequences. That very publication is the reason 
why most commemorations of the origins of ‘schizophre-
nia’ took place in 2011 and not in 2008.
 As for the theoretical foundations of Bleuler’s thinking 
on schizophrenia, 3 authors have to be mentioned: Jo-
hann Friedrich Herbart (1776–1841), Emil Kraepelin 
(1856–1926) and Sigmund Freud (1856–1939).
 Johann Friedrich Herbart was an influential philoso-
pher, educator and psychologist in the first half of the 
19th century. In the present context, his understanding 
of psychology as a science is important. In German speak-
ing countries 3 , Herbart was one of the main proponents 
of association theory, a basic epistemological concept of 
 3   The intellectual tradition of association theory is, of course, much 
broader. The epistemology of the Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711–
1776), for example, had specific variants of sensualism and association the-
ory as core components. 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
: 
Un
ive
rs
itä
t Z
ür
ich
,  
Ze
nt
ra
lb
ib
lio
th
ek
 Z
ür
ich
   
   
   
 
13
0.
60
.4
7.
22
 - 
6/
17
/2
01
6 
9:
16
:2
6 
AM
 Bleuler and Schizophrenia Neuropsychobiology 2012;66:6–13 9
mental events in general. It suggested that human mental 
life consists of multiple combinations (‘associations’) of 
single mental acts, especially sensory inputs. More com-
plex cognitive functions in this view are nothing but re-
sults of this continuous process of combining single, not 
to say atomistic basic units of mental life. Considering 
Bleuler’s statement cited above, where he emphasizes the 
notion of disturbed or interrupted mental functions in 
the pathogenesis of schizophrenic psychosis, it is obvious, 
that Herbart’s association psychology became and stayed 
a relevant point of reference for him.
 In addition, following Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920) 
and others, academic psychology of Bleuler’s time strong-
ly favored an experimental approach which, in many cas-
es, included the quantification of associative processes. 
His own general support of association psychology pro-
vided Bleuler with the opportunity to link quantitative 
and qualitative, especially hermeneutic, methods in psy-
chiatric research. Carl Gustav Jung (1875–1961), being a 
close collaborator of Bleuler at the Burghölzli from 1900 
to 1910, applied the technique of association experiments 
in his clinical studies on schizophrenia. Both Bleuler and 
Freud regarded this as a highly promising research field 4 . 
 Emil Kraepelin not only introduced the dichotomy of 
schizophrenic and manic-depressive psychoses, but also 
for the whole of his long psychiatric career made a strong 
claim for the existence and scientific detectability of nat-
ural disease entities in psychiatry. These entities, in his 
view, exist fully independently from the researcher or 
therapist. They are, as he liked to put it, ‘given by nature’ 
 [16] . Since Kraepelin well recognized that the chance to 
identify these entities by pathological anatomy or etio-
logical research in psychiatry of his time was rather low, 
he favored a clinical approach – in this case following 
Karl Ludwig Kahlbaum (1828–1899) – that mainly relied 
on the long-term course of illness. The prognosis of psy-
chotic disorders became, as will be mentioned shortly, a 
point of disagreement between him and Bleuler.
 Sigmund Freud, founder of psychoanalysis, experi-
enced some obstacles in communicating his concept to 
contemporary academic psychiatry which was generally 
skeptical, if not overtly disapproving. There is one major 
exception to this rule, Eugen Bleuler. Bleuler was the only 
influential academic psychiatrist of his time who not only 
entered the scientific debate on psychoanalysis, but also 
actively introduced psychoanalytic concepts into the di-
agnostic and therapeutic procedures of severely disturbed 
psychotic patients at the Burghölzli hospital. As Küchen-
hoff  [17] has shown in detail, Bleuler, though generally 
supporting psychoanalysis as significant part of psychia-
try, always maintained a critical attitude, especially with 
regard to the founding (1910) and inner structure of the 
International Psychoanalytical Association. 
 Summing up these theoretical issues, I refer to Schar-
fetter’s  [9, 18] convincing differentiation between four 
cornerstones of Bleuler’s concept of schizophrenia: 
 • Bleuler accepted Kraepelin’s clinical descriptions to a 
great extent when it comes to the differential diagnosis 
of schizophrenic psychoses, bipolar psychoses and 
other mental disorders. This may sound astonishing 
since Bleuler and Kraepelin are often described as 
strong antipodes. In some respects, they indeed are 
antipodes, but in other important respects they are 
definitely not. Clearly Bleuler differed from Kraepelin 
by insisting that schizophrenic patients do not neces-
sarily have a poor prognosis. Furthermore, he dis-
agreed with the strong notion of scientifically detect-
able natural disease entities in psychiatry which he, at 
least, rendered premature, especially when it comes to 
dementia praecox or schizophrenia. But – and that is 
more important here – Bleuler did support the clinical 
and descriptive approach by which Kraepelin had il-
lustrated in detail the clinical characteristics of ‘de-
mentia praecox’ as compared with other mental disor-
ders.  
 • Bleuler also agreed with Kraepelin’s epistemologically 
strong hypothesis of a (neuro-)biological causation of 
psychotic illness. This, nota bene, was not addressing 
any single psychopathological phenomenon, but the 
postulated ‘underlying disease process’, to use the 
kraepelinian term. Such a point of view did not rule 
out the clinical and scientific significance of psycho-
logical and social factors – especially not in Bleuler’s 
thinking, but it insisted on a brain dysfunction, albeit 
poorly described and understood, as a decisive com-
ponent of the etiology of schizophrenia both in Krae-
pelin and Bleuler.  
 • Following Herbart’s concept of association psycholo-
gy, Bleuler regarded the opposite of association, i.e. 
dissociation of mental functions, to be a core feature 
of the pathogenesis of schizophrenia. Therefore, Bleu-
ler’s ‘basic symptoms’, which will be illustrated below, 
strongly referred to this dichotomy between associa-
tive and dissociative qualities of human mental life.  
 • As already mentioned, Eugen Bleuler was the only in-
fluential academic psychiatrist of his time to openly 
 4   The relationships between Bleuler, Freud and Jung were complicated 
and led to growing areas of scientific and personal disagreement. This is-
sue cannot be discussed here in any detail. 
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and constantly support and apply psychoanalytical 
concepts in diagnosing and treating psychotic pa-
tients. There are interesting and detailed descriptions 
on how Bleuler and his colleagues 5 applied psychoan-
alytic techniques in interviewing patients and – the via 
regia of psychoanalysis according to Freud – in inter-
preting dreams  [19] . 
 Turning to the clinical perspective of Bleuler’s con-
cept, we first have to address two dichotomies he intro-
duced, basic and accessory symptoms on the one hand 
and primary and secondary symptoms on the other hand.
 In Bleuler’s understanding, basic symptoms of schizo-
phrenia like disorders of association, ambivalence or a 
certain type of autistic behavior (not to be mixed up with 
the modern notion of autism) are necessarily present in 
any schizophrenic person, no matter what clinical type or 
course of illness he or she might represent. As opposed to 
that, accessory symptoms may or may not be present in 
schizophrenia, they are no mandatory prerequisite for 
this diagnosis. It is remarkable that Bleuler regarded clin-
ically prominent psychotic features like hearing voices, 
paranoid ideas or psychomotor abnormalities as being 
accessory, although they often dominate the clinical pic-
ture.
 The second dichotomy between primary and second-
ary symptoms introduces the etiological perspective. For 
Bleuler, primary symptoms directly, i.e. causally, result 
from the postulated underlying neurobiological dysfunc-
tion, whereas secondary symptoms are seen as psycho-
logically understandable reactions of the mentally ill per-
son to his or her psychotic experiences, e.g. to deeply dis-
turbing primary symptoms as loosening of associations 
or other formal thought disorders. 
 The point, at which Bleuler most significantly depart-
ed from Kraepelin’s position, was the long-term course of 
schizophrenia. In Bleuler’s view, based upon many years 
of personal experience with chronically psychotic pa-
tients in the mental hospital in Rheinau and also later at 
the Burghölzli in Zurich, the group of schizophrenias 
may display a highly heterogeneous course of illness from 
a once-in-a-lifetime psychotic episode with full recovery 
over recurrent episodes with different degrees of (in mod-
ern terms) negative symptoms until, the worst case, a 
steady deterioration as seen in many cases of hebephrenic 
schizophrenia. That is why Bleuler – in the passage quot-
ed above – insisted that schizophrenia does not necessar-
ily begin early in life (is not necessarily ‘praecox’) nor 
does it always lead to a serious, if not catastrophic mental 
deterioration (not to ‘dementia’ in a kraepelinian sense).
 Finally, as mentioned in the context of his theoretical 
approach, Bleuler included hermeneutic elements, not all 
of them classical psychoanalytical techniques, of course, 
in the diagnosis and therapy of his schizophrenic patients 
in a very pragmatic manner. One aspect is crucial in order 
to understand his pragmatism. It was not Bleuler’s inten-
tion to implement psychoanalysis per se, but as one, al-
beit an important tool supporting his general attitude to-
wards psychotic patients. They should be treated with re-
spect and as much closeness as possible. His son, Manfred 
Bleuler (1986), put it this way:
 ‘One of Bleuler’s main aims in choosing and following 
his career was to arrive at an understanding of the schizo-
phrenic symptoms as expressions of an inner psychody-
namic life…. He studied the schizophrenic’s inner life es-
sentially in the same way as we study the inner life of 
neurotics, of healthy men, and of ourselves’  [20] .
 So Bleuler, very much unlike Kraepelin, saw no contra-
diction between the basic assumption of an underlying 
neurobiological dysfunction in schizophrenia and the 
systematic application of hermeneutic and psychoanalyt-
ical methods to what his patients experienced and told 
him about. Given that basic attitude, it was only conse-
quent for Bleuler to regard the neurobiological etiology of 
schizophrenic psychoses as a strong and scientifically im-
portant hypothesis, which, however, did not exclude the 
option of psychogenesis. Bleuler therefore also rejected 
the idea of a clear dividing line between schizophrenic (or, 
in general, psychotic) states on the one hand and neuroses 
on the other hand, at least regarding the relevance of psy-
chological, i.e. hermeneutically approachable, features.
 When it comes to the interaction of neurobiological 
and psychological factors, Bleuler outlined a framework 
that, in part, is strongly suggestive of the modern concept 
of vulnerability. The following quotation illustrates these 
aspects by which Bleuler further developed the kraepe-
linian perspective of ‘dementia praecox’ into a direction 
still relevant today:
 ‘But we have to add that the presupposition of an or-
ganic disease process is not absolutely necessary. It is pos-
sible that the whole symptomatology is of psychological 
origin and that it might develop on the background of 
minor quantitative deviations from normality…. If there 
is a minor or barely progressive brain alteration, only a 
severe psychological trauma will be able to bring on the 
manifest illness. But the faster the disease process is pro-
gressing and the more pronounced the continuous alter-
 5   Some of these were Carl Gustav Jung, Karl Abraham, Franz Riklin, Al-
phonse Maeder, Ludwig Binswanger, Max Eitingon. 
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ation is, the smaller the causes will have to be that trigger 
increasingly prominent disturbances. At the end, even 
daily hassles will further destabilize the fragile mental 
balance. Therefore, in most cases both etiological factors 
contribute to the emergence of psychotic syndromes.’ [ 15 , 
pp. 373, 374, translated by P.H.].
 Eugen Bleuler and Schizophrenia Research Today 
 Going through the actual literature on schizophrenia, 
many different points of view and a considerable number 
of controversies will turn up. Some regard schizophrenia 
as a brain disease which still has to be diagnosed mainly 
by psychopathological means, but they expect the latter 
to lose importance as soon as reliable and valid biological 
markers of the illness will have been found  [21] . For oth-
ers, the clinical phenomenon that we call schizophrenia 
does exist on the symptom and syndrome levels, but def-
initely not as a separate or ‘natural’, i.e. neurobiological, 
disease entity. Even more, this epistemologically strong 
notion of a disease entity called schizophrenia is not only 
rendered unnecessary in this perspective, but is seen as 
misleading. Authors voting for that position suggest to 
‘deconstruct’ the term psychosis. ‘Deconstruction’ is a 
central idea to many postmodern philosophical concepts. 
They decline and, consequently, deconstruct classical 
‘grand theories’ like the notions of an autonomous sub-
ject, free will or apriorical presuppositions of generating 
knowledge (as, for example, Kant had suggested). Applied 
to psychiatry, this would mean to criticize and, finally, 
abolish such overarching notions that – in these authors’ 
view – have not been proven scientifically fruitful, e.g. 
 schizophrenia or  mental illness as a group of disease enti-
ties . Consequently, a redirection of the research focus to-
wards clinical symptoms and syndromes is postulated, 
no matter whether that research rests upon the neurosci-
entific, psychopathological or social sciences perspective 
 [22] . Again, others do accept the existence of a broad 
spectrum of psychotic disorders named ‘group of schizo-
phrenias’, but emphasize that there is no clear boundary 
between psychotic illness and healthy mental life. Studies 
have indeed repeatedly shown that subjective experiences 
we usually call psychotic can appear in the general popu-
lation in persons who neither seek psychiatric advice nor 
report any substantial impairment in their everyday life 
 [23] . Finally, there is a broad debate on whether and how 
‘schizophrenia’ should be implemented in the upcoming 
new versions of the operationalized diagnostic manuals, 
i.e. ICD-11 and DSM-V  [24, 25] . 
 If we link these scientific controversies about the exis-
tence and usefulness of the concept of schizophrenia with 
the political debate in several countries, whether that 
very concept, mainly due to its undeniable and strong 
stigmatizing properties, should eventually be banned 
and fully replaced by some other expression, one issue is 
evident: ‘Schizophrenia’, named and disseminated by Eu-
gen Bleuler 100 years ago, on the one hand became a ma-
jor psychiatric concept all over the world in a markedly 
short period of time and, on the other hand, has always 
been the object, not to say target of controversies. 
 There are, indeed, ‘lessons to learn’ when reflecting on 
Bleuler’s concept today. The following topics in my view 
are the most relevant ones for present-day psychiatry: 
 • Eugen Bleuler insisted on the complexity of the clini-
cal picture and especially the long-term course of what 
he proposed to call ‘group of schizophrenias’. This 
complexity includes and intertwines etiology, patho-
genesis and clinical symptomatology: 
 ‘On the basis of the same brain dysfunction one pa-
tient may fully recover, another one – given slightly 
different mental preconditions or missing stimulation 
or strong psychological traumatization – may become 
severely mentally disturbed. We cannot deduce differ-
ent courses of illness or different groups of illnesses, 
neither from psychological predispositions or experi-
ences nor from any supposed disease process.’ [ 15 , 
p. 375, translated by P.H.]. 
This attitude, in Bleuler’s case based on an experience 
with schizophrenic people lasting for decades, should 
also prevent us nowadays from accepting simplifying 
or one-sided descriptions or explanations of schizo-
phrenia too readily.
 • Although Eugen Bleuler in certain respects indeed was 
a naturalistic psychiatrist 6 , he opposed any overtly re-
ductionistic naturalism that declared psycho(patho)
logical phenomena including the notion of subjectivity 
as scientifically irrelevant  epi phenomena of neurobio-
logical processes. ‘Naturalism without reductionism’: 
that catchword comes close to Bleuler’s lifelong attitude 
towards psychiatric research – and the issue of natural-
ism is at the center of the actual debate on psychiatry, 
too  [28, 29] .  
 • As for deconstructing psychosis, the situation is simi-
larly complicated: Bleuler in a way deconstructed 
 6   His self-confident, but peculiar opinions on the mind-body-relation-
ship ran him into some trouble epistemologically, especially with regard to 
the grossly speculative naturalism and vitalism in his later work [26, 27]. 
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Kraepelin’s strong notion of dementia praecox and re-
placed it by a broader, more open and epistemologi-
cally ‘weaker’ concept, his ‘group of schizophrenias’. 
Bleuler was skeptical about scientifically overstated 
notions (like dementia praecox), but did not suggest a 
radical deconstruction of psychosis, leaving behind 
only a group of symptoms. In other words: He did not 
deny the necessity of a valid and clinically practicable 
concept of psychotic illness. 
 • Bleuler accepted (and stressed) the heterogeneity of 
schizophrenia, and therefore consequently supported 
quite different clinical and scientific methods to ap-
proach this field. In modern terms, one could say that 
Bleuler, strongly arguing for a neurobiological under-
pinning of schizophrenia, promoted and applied 
methods with a descriptive, hermeneutic and social 
science background in diagnosing and treating his 
schizophrenic patients. Regarding the present day sta-
tus of therapeutic options in schizophrenia, which is, 
of course, far beyond what Bleuler could have imag-
ined, his multidimensional concept looks more future 
oriented and – as we could say – personalized than 
Emil Kraepelin’s much more restricted notion of de-
mentia praecox  [30, 31] . To be more specific, there are 
especially two bleulerian positions that pointed be-
yond Kraepelin’s perspective and may well be fruitful 
for the present-day debate: his skeptical, but not fully 
disapproving view of ‘natural disease entities’, and his 
acceptance of hermeneutic methods in psychiatric re-
search. Today, these aspects turn up when possible tar-
gets of research are evaluated. Are these targets dis-
eases, syndromes or symptoms? And they play a sig-
nificant role when it comes to the epistemological and 
clinical status of operationalized psychiatric diagno-
ses as in ICD-10  [2] /DSM-IV  [3] and their suggested 
supplementation by qualitative elements (e.g. in op-
erationalized psychodynamic diagnoses  [32] ).  
 • Bleuler emphasized disturbances of association as core 
features in schizophrenia, phenomena, we would prob-
ably call cognitive symptoms. However, it was always 
clear for him that these cognitive domains cannot be 
separated categorically from the affective dimension. 
This may, at least in part, be a result of his energetic ap-
plication of psychoanalytical ideas and methods that 
systematically take the affective components of any ex-
perience and behavior into account. Again, this is a 
very modern topic. Cognition alone will not be a suf-
ficient issue in research and therapy for schizophrenic 
patients unless it is linked to affectivity and other rel-
evant psychopathological dimensions.  
 Three theses shall summarize the main ideas of this 
paper:
 (1)  Bleuler strongly emphasized disturbances of asso-
ciation as basic symptoms of schizophrenia. By doing so, 
he, on the one hand, continued the tradition of associa-
tion psychology, especially in the sense of Herbart in the 
early 19th century. On the other hand, and that is more 
relevant here, he also gave a strong impulse towards the 
development of a cognition-oriented research into schizo-
phrenia that took place in the 20th century. 
 (2)  Bleuler – like most of his contemporary colleagues 
in academic psychiatry – postulated a strong neurobio-
logical component in the etiology of schizophrenia. But 
he was and remained highly skeptical against the notion 
of natural disease entities that, in contrast, had always 
been at the center of Kraepelin’s nosological concept. 
Given the present-day debate on the status of schizophre-
nia, this bleulerian position, too, seems to be a modern 
one, but also a demanding one since it dares avoiding re-
assuring, but speculative nosological assumptions.
 (3)  Given the enormous complexity of schizophrenia 
on the clinical and research levels, Bleuler’s multidimen-
sional approach may be regarded useful nowadays be-
cause of its open-minded clinical attitude. Bleuler com-
bined differentiated psychopathological methods with an 
explicit long-term perspective on the course of illness. 
There is a tension, albeit not an explicit contradiction in 
Bleuler’s broad and, at times, highly speculative natural-
ism on the one hand and his pragmatic multidimension-
al approach to clinical work on the other hand. Although 
he may have underestimated the philosophical pitfalls of 
naturalism, he advocated – in modern terms – the com-
bination of neurobiology, psychopathology (including 
hermeneutics) and social sciences. And this seems to be 
a reasonable guideline also for present-day psychiatry.
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